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Abstract
This brief Essay summarizes, updates, and integrates work I have done elsewhere in order to
suggest, first, why cost-benefit analysis is not used in dispute settlement, second, how to evaluate
substitute formulae that are available for use within dispute settlement, and finally, how dispute
settlement and treaty-making relate to one another in this field. This Essay considers the role of
international discipline by dispute resolution bodies, in comparison to multilateral treaty-making
or other legislation. Treaty-making or other legislation may take the form of harmonization to one
degree or another, or importantly, may take the form of agreed rules of prescriptive jurisdiction,
such as mutual recognition or national treatment.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AS A VECTOR IN
DOMESTIC REGULATORY REFORM:
DISCRIMINATION, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS, AND NEGOTIATIONS
Joel P. Trachtman*
INTRODUCTION
In a variety of ways, trade values conflict with other regulatory values. In fact, by its very nature, regulation is an intervention in-a conflict with-the market. If the market would
achieve the desired regulatory result by itself, no regulation
would be needed. Certainly regulation can improve the operation of markets, and in this sense regulation may be consistent
with a desire for efficient markets. However, the presumptive
reason for other kinds of regulation-for protective or prudential regulation-is that the market itself does not sufficiently protect the relevant values. In these specific cases, political decision-making evaluates and overrides the market. This is as it
should be, and it works reasonably well in domestic systems.
However, in an interstate or in an international system, the capacity to impose trade detriment on others, while enjoying the
regulatory benefit at home,' or, even less benignly, the capacity
to use regulation to achieve protectionist goals, raise additional
issues.
An initial analysis would suggest that in theory, cost-benefit
analysis (i) encompassing all costs and benefits including "postmaterial" costs, (ii) encompassing both domestic and foreign
costs and benefits, and (iii) operating dynamically to seek out
the unique result that maximizes net benefit (or minimizes net
detriment), would be the unique best institutional structure for
responding to conflicts between trade values and other regula* Professor of International Law and Dean ad inteim, The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts 02155. This Essay was prepared for the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD")
Workshop on Regulatory Reform and the Multilateral Trading System, December 7-8,
2000. I appreciate the insights offered by other participants in that workshop.
1. See, e.g., Stephen Fidler, EU Rules 'May Cost Africa $700m', FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2000 (citing TSUNEHIRO OTSUKI ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, SAVING Two IN A BILLION: A
CASE STUDY TO QUANTIFY THE TRADE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS ON

AFRICAN EXPORTS (2000)).
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tory values. However, I have found no instances of this type of
cost-benefit analysis being used anywhere in order to address
conflicts between trade and other regulatory values.
Of course, once global cost-benefit analysis begins to include in its calculation adverse effects of regulation on foreign
persons, 2 either in the form of non-pecuniary externalities or pecuniary externalities, some kinds of regulation will appear more
costly. On the other hand, regulation that protects foreign persons or removes externalities will appear more beneficial. Environmentalists and deregulators alike would be required to accept the consequences of thinking globally and acting locally.
This brief Essay summarizes, updates, and integrates work I
have done elsewhere in order to suggest, first, why cost-benefit
analysis is not used in dispute settlement,3 second, how to evaluate substitute formulae that are available for use within dispute
settlement, and finally, how dispute settlement and treaty-making relate to one another in this field.4 This Essay considers the
role of international discipline by dispute resolution bodies, in
comparison to multilateral treaty-making or other legislation.
Treaty-making or other legislation may take the form of harmonization to one degree or another, or importantly, may take the
form of agreed rules of prescriptive jurisdiction, such as mutual
recognition or national treatment.
I. DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS FOR DISCIPLINING
NATIONAL REGULATION
Dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the World Trade
Organization 5 ("WTO") dispute settlement system, can be given
a variety of types of mandate. Tribunals may be instructed to
search for discrimination (national treatment or most-favored
nation treatment ("MFN")), to determine whether the national
2. As shown in a paper by the OECD Secretariat, Trade and Regulatoy Reform: Insights from the OECD Country Reviews and Other Analyses, TD/TC/WP(2000)21/Final
(Dec. 7-8, 2000), few states formally consider effects on international trade as part of
their domestic regulatory review processes.
3. For an extended analysis, see Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and ... Problems, CostBenefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 32 (1998).
4. For an extended analysis, see Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute
Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333 (1999).
5. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOl. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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measure is a rational means to a legitimate end, to determine
whether the national measure disproportionately impedes trade,
or to determine whether the national measure is the least trade
restrictive alternative reasonably available to achieve its end.
A. MultilateralRules RestrictingDiscrimination: National
Treatment and MFN
Since 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade6
("GATT") has contained requirements of national treatment
and MFN treatment in regulation. These types of requirements
are viewed as less intrusive on national prerogatives than requirements of proportionality, least trade restrictive alternative requirements, balancing tests or cost-benefit analysis. However, it
will be shown below that anti-discrimination norms may require
a rather high degree of intrusion. On the other hand, anti-discrimination norms may fail to discipline national measures that
hurt other states more than they help the state that imposes the
measure.
B. GATT Experience and the Like Products Problem
There seems to be little objection to anti-discrimination
rules, such as the national treatment obligation contained in Article III of GATT, or the MFN obligation contained in Article I of
GATT. However, these provisions, as applied, involve considerable scrutiny, sometimes quite strict, of domestic regulatory meaI
sures. They do so in two ways.
In a narrower range of cases, national treatment discipline
is dependent on the product-process distinction. That is, in recent cases, where a regulation is viewed as applying to a production process, as opposed to a product as such, Article III is
viewed as inapplicable. 7
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
7. See, e.g., United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Mar. 23, 1993, 39
B.I.S.D. 155 (1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991). For discussions of the product/
process distinction, see Robert E. Hudec, The Product-ProcessDoctrinein GATT/WFOJurisprudence, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
JOHN H. JACKSON (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick, eds., 2000); Robert Howse &
Donald Regan, The Product/ProcessDistinction-An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 249 (2000), and the cogent response to the
Howse/Regan paper from John Jackson.

2000]

DOMESTIC REGULATORY REFORM

More importantly, and more generally, any prohibition of
discrimination requires a prior determination that two products
or services are sufficiently "like" to merit equal treatment. The
"like products" issue can be a proxy for ajudicial examination of
the rationality of regulatory categories. As in the recent Asbestos
WTO panel decision,8 the determination of "likeness" is often
outcome determinative. WTO jurisprudence has so far declined
to provide a very specific definition of "like products," but perhaps the Asbestos case will provide an occasion for the Appellate
Body to address this issue. The panel in that case declined to
consider risk as a basis for finding products to be un-"like." This
position, if followed, would eviscerate the protection heretofore
thought provided to good faith, non-discriminatory regulation
under Article III of GATT. Of course, for most kinds of product
standards, these types of measures would be subject to scrutiny
under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade9 ("TBT
Agreement") or under the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures" ° ("SPS Agreement").
My point here is simply that issues of discrimination are not
so simple as they are sometimes thought to be, and that they
involve some difficult judgments. The judgment of whether two
products are "like" may be made using relatively discrete factors,
such as characteristics of the product, end-uses, cross-elasticity of
demand, etc. However, the decision whether two products are
"like" is viewed as a "case-by-case" decision, with much latitude
for judgment. Rules of national treatment are not necessarily
deferential to national regulation, as shown by the experience of
the recent Asbestos case, nor are they necessarily predictable in
their operation.

8. See European Communities-MeasuresAffecting Asbestos and Asbestos-ContainingProducts, Report of the Panel, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.130-.132 (Sept. 18, 2000) (holding
that risk to health is not a factor in determining "likeness" under article Ill of GATT);
see also United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23/14 (noting
that "the treatment of imported and domestic products as like products under Article
III may have significant implications for the scope of obligations under the General
Agreement and for the regulatory autonomy of contracting parties").
9. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/final_e.htm.
10. Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/finale.htm.
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II. THE PROBLEMS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND
THE ALTERNATIVES
As noted above, in economic theory, at least on an initial
examination, courts would be given a mandate to engage in allinclusive, dynamic, cost-benefit analysis in order to decide questions of conflict between local regulation and global trade. Assuming that courts could perform this cost-benefit analysis accurately, this would be the first-best solution to the trade versus
domestic regulation issue. (Note that international regulation
does not raise the same kinds of issues). But such cost-benefit
analysis is not explicitly used anywhere. Instead, courts receive
mandates to apply the following types of tests, individually or in
combination, and with many subtle differences within each type
of test:
1. National treatment rules. A national treatment rule is a
type of anti-discrimination rule that examines whether
different legal standards are applied to comparable
cases, as between the domestic and the foreign.
2. Simple means-ends rationality tests. These tests consider
whether the means chosen is indeed a rational means to
a purported end. Analytically, simple means-ends rationality testing is included in all of the tests described below
in this list, and is sometimes used as a proxy to detect
discrimination. As it imposes little real discipline, and is
often included in other tests, I do not analyze the use of
simple means-ends rationality testing in detail below.
3. Necessity or least trade-restrictivealternative tests. This type of
test inquires whether there is a less trade restrictive
means to accomplish the same end. The definition of
the end is often outcome-determinative. In some cases
necessity testing is qualified by requiring that the means
be the least trade restrictive alternative that is reasonably
available. In addition, necessity testing is sometimes combined with limitations on the categories of ends permitted.
4. Proportionality. Proportionality stricto sensul inquires
whether the means are "proportionate" to the ends:
11. NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAw: A
COMPARATIvE STUDY 6 (1996). A wider definition of proportionality developed in the
EU context includes three tests: (i) proportionality stricto sensu, (ii) a least trade restric-
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whether the costs are excessive in relation to the benefits.
It might be viewed as cost-benefit analysis with a margin
of appreciation, as it does not require that the costs be
less than the benefits. Proportionality may be either
static or comparative, in the same way as cost-benefit
analysis. A comparative approach to proportionality testing would include in its calculus the costs and benefits of
alternative rules.
5. Balancing Tests. Balancing tests purport to decide
whether a measure that impedes trade is acceptable, balancing all of the factors. Balancing may be viewed as a
kind of amorphous or imprecise cost-benefit analysis.' 2
More charitably, and perhaps more correctly, it may be
viewed as a kind of cost-benefit analysis that recognizes
the difficulty of formalizing the analysis, and seeks to
achieve similar results informally.' 3
6. Cost-benefit analysis. Static cost-benefit analysis in the context at hand1 4 juxtaposes the regulatory benefits of regulation with the trade costs of regulation, as well as other
costs of regulation, and would strike down regulation
where the costs exceed the benefits. Cost-benefit analysis
in this context may be viewed as stricter scrutiny than the
tive alternative test, and (iii) a simple means-ends rationality test. This Essay will consider only the narrower type of proportionality.
12. See Michael E. Smith, State DiscriminationsAgainst Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1203, 1205 (1979) (stating that "the Justices take all relevant circumstances into
account and render judgment according to their overall sense of the advantages and
disadvantages of upholding the regulation"). At their most precise, balancing tests are
the same as cost-benefit analysis. See Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too MuchAn Examination of Commerce ClauseJurisprudence,50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 47, 59-60 (1981).
13. "If we had a way of quantifying all the appropriate inputs, and a way of comparing them, and a theory that told us how to do so, we would not call it balancing. Rather,
it would be called something like 'deriving the most cost-effective solution,' or just 'solving the problem.'" Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 825, 839 (1994). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 1002-1004 (1987).
14. For more general and technical treatment of cost-benefit analysis, see, e.g.,
PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 81-160
(1994); D. PEARCE & C. NASH, THE SOCIAL APPRAISAL OF PROJECTS: A TEXT IN COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (1981); R. Tresch, Public Finance: A Normative Theory (1981);
EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978); EJ.
MISHAN, COsT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1976); H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968). See also
the recent special issue of The Journal of Legal Studies devoted to cost-benefit analysis,
beginning at 29J. LEG. STUDS. 837 (2000) (including papers by W. Kip Viscusi, Amartya
Sen, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Posner, and Gary Becker).
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U.S. domestic cost-benefit analysis that has recently become popular, as it adds a cost dimension not normally
included: detriments to trade. Adding trade detriments
to the calculation would presumably have the marginal
effect of causing some regulation to fail a cost-benefit
analysis test. It is worth comparing static cost-benefit
analysis, simply juxtaposing the costs and benefits of a
single rule, with a more dynamic comparative cost-benefit analysis, comparing the net benefits of multiple rules,
and recommending the rule with the greatest net benefits.
There are several reasons why a full cost-benefit analysis test
may indeed be less than optimal, and one or more of these other
tests might be preferred. In this Essay, I evaluate some of the
parameters by which cost-benefit analysis might be compared
with other tradeoff devices: (i) maximization of net gains of
trade and regulation, (ii) administrability, (iii) distributive concerns, (iv) moral concerns, and (v) theoretical concerns. These
factors are not themselves commensurable, and so we cannot
place them on a simple tote board to determine when comparative cost-benefit analysis should or should not be used. Rather,
these factors must be examined and subjected to political or deliberative analysis in order to determine which tradeoff device
should be used in particular circumstances.
However, very briefly,' 5 it is clear that cost-benefit analysis
experiences severe problems of administrability (including predictability). Cost-benefit analysis does not concern itself with the
distribution of the costs and benefits, and so it could raise significant distributive issues. Cost-benefit analysis raises important
moral concerns regarding the commensurability between different kinds of values, including especially between material and
post-material values. Political institutions, as opposed to adjudicative or research institutions, are most appropriate to commensurate among these types of values. Cost-benefit analysis raises
related theoretical concerns in economics about its implicit interpersonal comparison of utility: your valuation of the environment cannot be compared by a third party to my valuation of an
SUV.
15. For a more extended analysis, see Trachtman, supra note 3.
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My analysis suggests that a least trade restrictive alternative
analysis overcomes some of the most difficult of these concerns,
and might be worthy of consideration. First, as it only measures
the detriment to trade, not the benefits of regulation, it is easier
to administer. Second, it does not seek to commensurate between these values, as it simply seeks the method of satisfying the
non-trade values that imposes the least detriment in trade terms.
For similar reasons, it raises fewer concerns regarding interpersonal comparison of utility.
Let us be clear, though, that least trade restrictive alternative analysis might leave in place a domestic regulation that provides benefits far smaller than the trade detriments it causes, and
might strike down domestic regulation that is far more valuable
than the trade detriments it causes. Thus, it is both under-inclusive and over-broad. Of course, least trade restrictive alternative
analysis has been adopted judicially in connection with the application in some circumstances of Article XX of GATT, and has
been adopted "legislatively" in both the SPS Agreement 6 and
the TBT Agreement.1 7
A. "Legislative" versus JudicialDecision-Making and
Rules versus Standards
While trade diplomats and scholars have expressed pride at
the Uruguay Round achievement of more binding and more
"law-oriented" dispute resolution, the same group and a variety
of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and other commentators question the jurisdictional scope of dispute resolution. After all, should these small tribunals, lacking direct democratic legitimacy, determine profound issues confronting the international trading community, such as the relationship between
trade values and environmental values? Many voices have called
for greater international legislation (specific treaty-making) in
these important fields. This section is intended to outline a
more realistic and nuanced view, based on law and economics
analytical techniques. It is intended to suggest the reasons why
dispute resolution could be the appropriate place to determine
16. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, arts. 2.2, 5.6, at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs.e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
17. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, ITO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 2.2, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/final_e.htm.
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these issues. Conversely, it is intended to suggest a way to determine or predict when these issues might better be subjected to
more specific legislative action.
The analysis above of different "tradeoff devices" assumes
that a legislative act (including the entry into a treaty) has assigned a mandate to a court. However, in addition to a choice
among mandates to courts, there is a choice whether and to what
extent to provide a mandate to courts. It is possible for the legislative act to provide either a broad or a narrow mandate to a
court. A narrow mandate will call for less discretion to be exercised by the court. Economic analysis provides two related analytical techniques that suggest when the authors of treaties might
decide to accord narrower or broader mandates to courts.
Not only do treaty-writers delegate authority to dispute resolution tribunals, they also maintain complex relationships with
the dispute resolution process, both formal and informal. First,
of course, is the possibility of legislative reversal: if the authors
of the treaty become discontented with the manner of its application, they may change the treaty. Furthermore, they may restrain dispute resolution. Second, and relatively unusual in general international law, is a formal "political filter" device. This
political filter was much more important prior to the 1994
changes to WTO dispute resolution, but still exists in attenuated
form.
The incomplete contracts literature considers the reasons
for, and implications, of, the fact that all contracts (like all treaties) are necessarily incomplete in their capacity to specify the
norms that will be applied to particular conduct. In the rules
versus standards literature,' 8 a law is a "rule" to the extent that it is
specified in advance of the conduct to which it is applied. A
standard, on the other hand, is a law that is farther toward the
other end of the spectrum, in relative terms. It establishes general guidance to both the person governed and the person
charged with applying the law, but does not specify in detail, in
18. For an introduction to the rules versus standards discussion in law and economics, see Louis Kaplow, General Characteristicsof Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND

ECONOMICS (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest eds., 1998); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); see also, Cass R. Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 955 (1995). In international trade law, "standards" has a
specific meaning, referring to product standards. This meaning is separate from the
sense in which "standards" is used here.
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advance, the conduct required or proscribed. The relativity of
these definitions is critical. Furthermore, each law is comprised
of a combination of rules and standards. However, it will be useful to speak here generally of rules as separate from standards.
It is worth noting that the distinction between a rule and a
standard is not necessarily grammatical or determined by the
number of words used to express the norm; rather, the distinction relates to how much work remains to be done to determine
the applicability of the norm to a particular circumstance.
Professor Hadfield applies an incomplete contracts analysis
to statutes, which we in turn can apply to treaties. 19 Treaties may
be optimally incomplete with appropriate instructions to decision-makers to complete the "contract" in particular cases. The
parameters to consider include (i) the costs of advance specification, (ii) the degree to which the future is unpredictable or
stochastic, (iii) the ability to customize to particular facts in specific cases, and (iv) the potential value of diversity of compliance
techniques. This literature tends to treat the legislature as a unitary actor. It will be exceedingly important for us to recognize
that the legislature in our case (as in Hadfield's) is a group of
actors subject to strategic and social choice limitations on their
ability to act.
Incompleteness of specification may not simply be a result
of conservation of resources. It may be a more explicit political
decision to either agree to disagree for the moment, to avoid the
political price that may arise from immediate hard decisions, or
to cloak the hard decisions in the false inevitability of judicial
interpretation. It is important, also, to recognize that the incompleteness of specification may represent a failure to decide how
the policy expressed relates to other policies. This is critical in
the trade area, where often the incompleteness of a trade rule
relates to its failure to address, or incorporate, non-trade policies. Thus, for example, the chapeau of Article XX of GATT may
be viewed as providing a standard as to "arbitrariness," 'justifiability," and "discrimination."
Obviously, each law is comprised of a combination of rules
19. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective
on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541, 547 (1994); see also Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.

J. 729 (1992).

736

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:726

and standards. However, it will be useful to speak here generally
of rules as separate from standards.
1. The Costs and Benefits of Rules and Standards
Rules are more expensive to develop than standards, ex ante,
because rules entail specification costs, including drafting costs
and negotiation costs, as well as the strategic costs involved in ex
ante specification. In order to reach agreement on specification-in order to legislate specifically-there may be greater
costs in public choice terms.2" This is particularly interesting in
the trade context, where treaty-making would be subjected to intense domestic scrutiny, while application of a standard by a dispute resolution process might be subjected to reduced scrutiny.
On the other hand, NGOs have sought in this connection to enhance transparency in dispute resolution. Finally, rules require
clear decision; standards may serve as an agreement to disagree,
or may help to mask or mystify a decision made. 21 Under standards, both sides in the legislative process may claim victory, at
least initially.
Rules are generally thought to provide greater predictability. There are two moments at which to consider predictability.
First, is the ability of persons subject to the law to be able to plan
and conform their conduct ex ante, sometimes known as "primary predictability. '22 The second moment in which predictability is important is ex post, after the relevant conduct has taken
place. Where the parties can predict the outcome of dispute resolution-where they can predict the tribunal's determination of
their respective rights and duties-they will spend less money on
litigation. This type of predictability is "secondary predictability." Both types of predictability can reduce costs. While rules
appear to provide primary and secondary predictability, tribunals may construct exceptions in order to do what is, by their
lights, substantial justice, and thereby reduce predictability. It
20. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective
on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541, 550 (1994) (citing Linda R. Cohen & Roger
G. Noll, How to Vote, Whether to Vote: Strategiesfor Voting and Abstaining on Congressional
Role Calls, 13 POL. BEHAV. 97 (1991)).

21. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1998).

22. For this use of the terms "primary predictability" and "secondary predictability," see William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3
(1963).
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may be difficult to constrain the ability of tribunals to do this.
Furthermore, as noted below, game theory predicts that some
degree of uncertainty-of unpredictability-may enhance the
ability of the parties to bargain to a lower cost solution. Thus,
simple predictability is not the only measure of a legal norm;
rather, we must also be concerned with the ability of the legal
norm to provide satisfactory outcomes. In economic terms, we
must be concerned with the allocative efficiency of the outcome.
We consider allocative efficiency below as we consider the institutional dimension of rules and standards.
As we consider the relative allocative efficiency of potential
outcomes, we must recognize that there is a temporal distinction
between rules and standards. Standards may be used earlier in
the development of a field of law before sufficient experience to
form a basis for more complete specification is acquired. In
many areas of law, courts develop a jurisprudence that forms the
basis for codification-or even rejection-by legislatures. With
this in mind, legislatures (or adjudicators) may set standards at
an early point in time, and determine to establish rules at a later
point in time.2 3 It is clear that a rule of stare decisis is not necessary to the development of a body of jurisprudence by a court or
dispute resolution tribunal. 21 It is also worth noting that in a
common law setting, or any setting where tribunals refer to
precedents, the tribunal may announce a standard in a particular case, and then elaborate that standard in subsequent cases
until it has built a structure of rules for its own application.
Kaplow points out that where instances of the relevant behavior are more frequent, economies of scale will indicate that
rules become relatively more efficient. For circumstances that
arise only infrequently, it is more difficult to justify promulgation
of specific rules. In addition, rules provide compliance benefits:
they are cheaper to obey, because the cost of determining the
required behavior is lower. Rules are also cheaper to apply by a
court: the court must only determine the facts and compare
them to the rule.

23. See Kaplow, The General Characteristicsof Rules, supra note 14, at 10.
24. David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92
AM.J. INT'L L. 398 (1998).
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2. The Institutional Dimension of Rules and Standards
Another distinction between rules and standards, often deemphasized in this literature, is the institutional distinction:
with rules, the legislature often "makes" the decision, while with
standards, the adjudicator determines the application of the
standard, thereby "making" the decision. Again, it is obvious
that these terms are used in a relative sense (this caveat will not
be repeated). Economists and even lawyer-economists seem to
assume that the tribunal simply "finds" the law, and does not
make it. Of course, courts can make rules pursuant to statutory
or constitutional authority: the hallmark of a rule is that it is
specified ex ante, not that it is specified by a legislature. However, at least in the international trade system, rules are largely
made by treaty, and standards are largely applied by tribunals.
But the difference between legislators and courts is an important one, and may affect the outcome. 25 The choice of legislators or courts to make particular decisions should be made using cost-benefit analysis. Such a cost-benefit analysis would include, as a critical factor, the degree of representativeness of
constituents: which institution will most accurately reflect citizens' desires? There are good reasons why such cost-benefit
analysis does not always select legislatures. First, there is a public
choice critique of legislatures. Second, even under a public interest analysis, legislatures may not be efficient at specifying ex
ante all of the details of treatment of particular cases. Third, the
rate of change of circumstances over time may favor the ability
of courts to adjust. Finally, we must analyze the strategic relationship between legislators and courts. Thus, in order fully to
understand the relationship between rules and standards, the
tools of public choice or positive political theory 26 should be
relationship between legislative
brought to bear to analyze the
27
and judicial decision-making.
3. The Strategic Dimension of Rules and Standards
It is not possible to consider the costs and benefits of rules
25. See NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994).

26. See, e.g.,John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992).
27. Robert Cooter & Josef Drexl, The Logic of Power in the Emerging European Constitution: Game Theory and the Division of Powers, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 307 (1994).
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and standards separately from the strategic considerations that
would cause states to select a rule as opposed to a standard.
Johnston analyzes rules and standards from a strategic perspective, finding that, under a standard, bargaining may yield immediate efficient agreement, whereas under a rule, this condition
may not obtain. 28 Johnston considers a rule a "definite, ex ante
entitlement" and a standard a "contingent, ex post entitlement."
Like Kaplow, he does not consider the source of the rule,
whether legislature or tribunal.
Johnston notes the "standard supposition in the law and economics literature ... that private bargaining between [two parties] over the allocation of [a] legal entitlement is most likely to
be efficient if the entitlement is clearly defined and assigned ex
ante according to a rule, rather than made contingent upon a
judge's ex post balancing of relative value and harm. ' 29 Johnston suggests this supposition may be incorrect,"° "When the parties bargain over the entitlement when there is private information about value and harm, bargaining may be more efficient
under a blurry balancing test than under a certain rule."'3 This
is because under a certain rule, the holder of the entitlement
will have incentives to "hold out" and decline to provide information about the value to him of the entitlement. Under a standard, where presumably it cannot be known with certainty ex
ante who owns the entitlement, the person not possessing the
entitlement may credibly threaten to take it, providing incentives
for the other person to bargain. Johnston points out that this
result is obtained only when the ex post balancing test is imperfect, because if the balancing were perfect, the threat would not
be credible. This provides a counter-intuitive argument for inaccuracy of the application of standards. 2 Interestingly, further
research as to the magnitude of strategic costs under rules and
under standards might suggest that over time, rules provide
some of the strategic benefits of standards. This might be so if
28. Jason Scott Johnston, Bargainingunder Rules versus Standards, 11 J. L. EcoN. &
ORG. 256 (1995).
29. Id.
30. See also Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577
(1988); Joel P. Trachtman, Externalities and Extraterritoriality,in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (Jagdeep Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1998).
31. Johnston, supra note 24, at 257.
32. Id. at 272.
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tribunals develop exceptions to rules in a way that introduces
uncertainty to their application. This increased benefit would of
course be countervailed to some extent by the reduction of predictability that the development of exceptions would entail.
I do not, in this brief Essay, give examples of how these considerations might apply to actual cases.3 3
B. Improving "Legislation"
There are several problems with the international treaty system: with international legislation. First, it is functionally Balkanized: trade, environment, health, competition, tax, etc., are
all dealt with separately, and there is insufficient coordination.
Second, legislation takes place largely through new treaty-making, and this generally requires unanimity. Thus, international
legislation is slow to respond to many emerging, overlapping issues. By default, many of these issues are referred to dispute
resolution in the WTO. The WTO dispute resolution system
seems to bear too much responsibility, compared to the international legislative system. This section considers how the legislative capacity of the international regulatory system can be improved.
1. Improving Functional Integration Through Horizontal
Institutional Coordination
There is already much cooperation between the WTO and
the United Nations Environmental Program ("UNEP") and Multilateral Environmental Agreements ("MEAs"). There needs to
be more cooperation, and at some level, the relationship between trade norms and other norms need to be worked out
more definitively, and more formally. For example, the European Union has recently argued that greater clarification of the
validity of MEA norms within the WTO legal system would be
useful, while the United States has argued that the WTO dispute
resolution system has set forth an adequate test for the validity of
MEA norms that may conflict with trade norms. Functional integration could take the form of choice of law and/or choice of
forum rules, when these norms come into conflict, rules regarding supremacy of norms, later in time rules, interpretative rules
33. See Trachtman, supra note 4.
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that seek to avoid conflict, or at the extreme, joint formulation
of norms, as we would expect within a domestic system. For example, a type of "choice of law" rule might specify that certain
MEAs override certain trade law obligations.
2. Request-Offer Negotiations Regarding National Regulation
How would more specific international law regarding domestic regulation be made; how would rules regarding the interplay between trade and other norms be legislated? There may
also be room for further elaboration of standards in certain areas.3 4 Rules can be developed by courts through the application
of standards over time. Rules are more often made by legislatures. Sometimes judicial action can act as a pathfinder for legislation: legislative action can respond, positively or negatively, to
judicial action.
Thus, the United States, having lost in the Shrimp-Turtle35
case, might seek new treaty action, either within or without the
WTO, to approve its action. Now that the Appellate Body has
spoken in that case, the onus is on the United States to seek
"legislative reversal." However, the Appellate Body has not provided an extremely clear response: this is why the EU is seeking
greater legislative clarification. In accordance with the strategic
rules-standards perspective, the lack of perfect clarity promotes
negotiation. This is an example of the problem of "asset ownership" in this field: if it were clear that WTO law never permits
process standards as barriers to import, it would be for those
states that wish to impose such barriers to negotiate for exceptions. Given some ambiguity, both sides have some incentive to
negotiate. Negotiations take place in the shadow of judicial action.
It is important to recognize that there is a distributive aspect
to these norms. In order to achieve greater specificity-in order
to legislate rules-it will be necessary to negotiate transactions
between states. The original WTO style of tariff negotiationsrequest/offer-may be appropriate for use in the regulatory
field. That is, states could request exceptions for their regula34. On December 24, 1998, the WTO Committee on Trade in Services adopted
the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, S/L/64, developed by the
WTO Working Party on Professional Services.
35. United States-Import Prohibitionsof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
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tion, or alternatively, states could request liberalization of another state's regulation, in exchange for another concession.
The advantage of this type of transaction-a rule-based transaction-is that states would know in advance what types of modifications of their domestic regulation would be required, or what
kinds of liberalization in other states they had achieved. These
modifications could then be legitimated as part of the trade negotiations, instead of being left to the dispute resolution process.
Negotiations in the WTO context may provide an advantage
over negotiations in a MEA or UNEP, or other functional international organization, context: the greater possibility of linked
package deals. While linkages may be made across functional
organizations, it is easier to do so, both administratively and in
terms of legitimation, within a single organization. The WTO
already contains much scope for package deals. Thus, there is a
network externality argument for inclusion of additional subject
matter in the WTO.
3. High-Powered Incentives to Negotiate: Selective (and
Weighted?) Majority Voting as a Means to Redress
the Adjudication/Legislation Imbalance
In order to provide even stronger incentives to negotiate
than those existing with simply a judicial prod, states could agree
on selective, and possibly weighted, majority voting. The incoming Director-General of the WTO, Thai Trade Minister
Supachai, has already broached this issue. For an example of
selective majority voting, states could agree that MEAs, perhaps
with a specified minimum number of parties, might in the future
be exempted from WTO prohibitions by majority vote. If majority voting were the applicable legislative rule, states would have
greater incentives to come to terms on unanimously agreed resolution of trade versus regulation problems. Furthermore, majority voting would redress the current imbalance in the capacity to
act between WTO adjudication and multilateral treaty-making. 6

36. For a story of a similar imbalance in the European Union context, see Joseph
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
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4. Reducing the Problem of Private Information: The
Potential Role of International Organizations in
Evaluating Regulatory Barriers
One of the most serious obstacles to negotiations regarding
regulatory barriers to trade is lack of knowledge. This ignorance
exists on several dimensions: (i) what are the trade costs associated with the relevant regulation; (ii) what are the full regulatory
benefits associated with the relevant regulation; (iii) is there a
less trade restrictive alternative? An independent party may assist negotiations by serving as an independent source of this information, overcoming information asymmetries between the
parties. Private information may impede negotiation toward the
reduction of barriers.
5. Legitimating Adjudication
As indicated above, trade versus regulation decisions put a
good deal of pressure on the adjudicator. Mandates that do so
explicitly would help to legitimate this allocation of responsibility, while alleviating some of the criticism of the dispute settlement process. In addition, as noted above, a more effective
structure for legislation would reduce concern about the legitimacy of adjudication. If legislative reversal were more readily
available, adjudication would be more responsive.
CONCLUSION
Current arrangements for addressing the interface between
trade and domestic regulation may not be satisfactory. National
treatment standards may not be as unintrusive as advertised, and
may leave in place measures that should be disciplined. Decisions to assign responsibility for disciplining national regulation
must consider various alternative mandates. However, these decisions must be examined in comparison to decisions to provide
greater treaty or legislative guidance. This Essay considers the
choice among general standards that can form the basis for a
mandate to dispute resolution bodies in juxtaposition to the
choice to provide more specific treaty rules.

